KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
For weeks, concerns over the risk of miscalculation or even intentional escalation between Israel and Hezbollah have dominated attention. Ramped up cross-border attacks between the two sides on Sunday, August 25 have left each side simultaneously claiming success “for now,” suggesting a much-feared larger conflagration may have been averted in the near term. However, implications for longer-term risk and mutual deterrence, Iran’s calculations for escalation, and linkage to the still-elusive Gaza cease-fire remain uncertain.
USIP’s Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen discusses the significance of the weekend’s attacks for the prospects of regional escalation and the ongoing war in Gaza.
Kurtzer-Ellenbogen: All signs point to the August 25 escalation as a coda to weeks of concern that Israel’s and Hezbollah’s months-long back-and-forth strikes would burst into full-on war. Fears had first mounted in light of the July 27 deadly rocket that killed 12 children in the northern Israeli Druze village of Majdal Shams: an incident for which Hezbollah denied both responsibility or intent, but which Israeli and U.S. intelligence concluded was minimally the result of Hezbollah hardware. Three days later came Israel’s July 30 assassination of Hezbollah senior commander, Fuad Shukr, whom the Israeli Defense Forces said was responsible for the Majdal Shams attack, as well as for Hezbollah’s ongoing attacks on Israel since October 8.
When Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated on Iranian soil on July 31, a presumed Israeli operation, fear of Hezbollah’s patron Iran leading or joining a coordinated charge against Israel had the region and the international community fearing the worst. For now, following what Israel termed a “preemptive strike” by 100 fighter jets at Hezbollah rockets and launchers, and Hezbollah’s immediately subsequent launch of hundreds of rockets and dozens of drones into Israel on Sunday, each side is walking away claiming success: Israel for taking the edge off what could have been a much larger and more damaging attack, and Hezbollah framing its subsequent attacks against Israeli military targets as a win that yielded fulfillment of its objectives.
Both sides seem keen not to rule out further engagement, with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu noting that the Israeli strike was not “the end of the story,” and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah saying that they will assess the impact of their attack and reserve the right to “respond another time” if they deem necessary. However, both leaders simultaneously signaled intent and expectation of a pause, with Nasrallah saying in an August 26 speech, that Lebanon can “breathe a sigh of relief,” and Israel reopening its airport after a brief closure within hours of the military exchange.
So far, this latest incident underscores a prevailing sense that neither side sees large-scale conflagration in its interest. What remains is a delicate, if dangerous, dance of establishing deterrence, saving face and answering to domestic constituencies, both in Israel and in Lebanon. In Israel, 60,000 Israeli citizens remain displaced from the north, schools won’t reopen in the fall due to the Hezbollah threat, and there is a desire among the public to address the danger posed by Hezbollah, even amid ambivalence as to whether the most effective way to neutralize the threat is via war as opposed to ongoing U.S.-led diplomacy.
Meanwhile, in an already beleaguered Lebanon, where upward of 90,000 Lebanese have been displaced from the southern part of the country, there is scant appetite to be dragged into war by Hezbollah. To this end, both sides are claiming they have established deterrence, and Nasrallah appears to be signaling a desire for rules of relatively restrained and retaliation-only engagement by taking pains in his speech to note the military and non-civilian nature of the targets as parallel revenge for the narrow targeting of Shukr.
Accordingly, at this point on Israel’s northern and Lebanon’s southern border, the watched pot finally hit a boiling point, refrained from spilling over and for now will return to a simmer. Notably, however, the question of when — or if — Iran will respond to Haniyeh’s assassination remains unanswered.
Kurtzer-Ellenbogen: What Sunday’s Israel-Hezbollah engagement made clear is that a decision was taken to separate the response to the Shukr and the Haniyeh assassinations, with Nasrallah directly stating that the delay in response was partially driven by Iran’s and its proxies’ deliberations as to whether a collective or individual set of attacks on Israel was the best course. In keeping with Nasrallah’s additionally articulated reason for the delay — exacting a psychological price on Israel with its waiting-game — the message suggests that Iran is reserving the space to offer its own response to the Haniyeh assassination.
The U.S. administration has asserted its belief that Iran remains “postured and poised” to launch an attack, and Iranian government officials have stated that retaliation for Haniyeh’s assassination is “certain” but will not be “hasty,” and that its response will be “unpredictable.” That said, in addition to the possibility of harder and softer-line divisions among Iranian decisionmakers — with Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, potentially poised to take a less escalatory or singularly dramatic approach than his late predecessor may have been inclined to — there is also the fact that while the attack on Haniyeh was an embarrassing security breach on Iranian soil, the victim was not Iranian. This also gives Iran some space to demur from a direct and immediate response.
Beyond a high-profile single incident, Iran also has Israeli pressure points to indirectly push. This includes through its ongoing support to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, whether in Gaza or the West Bank, where Iran need not directly call the shots but can provide the means for these groups to threaten Israeli security interests. But if the delayed or indirect response suggests Iran’s hedging and reluctance to enter into all-out war with Israel, the threat of direct escalation can never be ruled out — even with careful calibration.
Israel is pointing fingers at Iran directly for the threats it identifies as the reason for its large-scale raid into the northern West Bank towns of Jenin and Tulkarem on August 28.
Israel is pointing fingers at Iran directly for the threats it identifies as the reason for its large-scale raid into the northern West Bank towns of Jenin and Tulkarem on August 28 a significant ratcheting up of Israeli military action in the West Bank, even as the war in Gaza continues. Israel’s foreign minister, Israel Katz, described the operation as designed to “thwart Islamic-Iranian terrorist infrastructure” and ascribed to Iran the goal of establishing an “eastern front” against Israel through a “systematic strategy” of weapons and explosive smuggling.
The region may be able to take the “breath” that Hezbollah’s Nasrallah invoked but cannot let down its guard.
Kurtzer-Ellenbogen: While there are ripple effects between the different fronts and the war in Gaza, the direct impact on efforts to end the war are not yet felt. An additional reason for the delay in Hezbollah’s response that Nasrallah cited in his August 25 speech was to provide the opportunity for Gaza cease-fire talks to succeed. Even earlier in August, after pledging a vigorous response for the Haniyeh assassination, Iranian officials had suggested that such an outcome could be avoided if cease-fire negotiations resulted in a deal. Ostensibly, making this connection provided a face-saving prospect for Iran should it decide not to retaliate for the Haniyeh assassination, enabling it to avoid an escalation that could draw in U.S. forces and capacity, while claiming credit, via its leverage, for a potential end to the ongoing death and destruction in Gaza should a deal be reached.
Additionally, with Hamas’ new political chief and mastermind of the October 7 attacks, Yahya Sinwar, ensconced in an underground bunker in Gaza, and the group’s depleted fighting capacity, the ability for fellow Iranian axis allies to keep the pressure on Israel on other fronts could be construed as serving the Hamas leader’s interest if he assumes that Israel may be induced to wind down one front before fully confronting another. But as negotiations drag on, and talks that were taking place in Cairo continued on the 25th in spite of the Israel-Hezbollah escalation, a cease-fire has proven elusive.
All eyes are back on the talks that didn’t end with the weekend’s events and the success of which most directly rests with the leadership of Israel and of Hamas.
Iran’s and its partner’s efforts to connect belligerent action to the war in Gaza are also not new. Hezbollah has previously indicated that it would cease its attacks on Israel, ongoing since October 8, should a cease-fire be reached, and the Houthis, yet another group supported by Iran in the latter’s axis of regional partners, suggested they might stand down their attacks on Red Sea shipping should a cease-fire take hold. Such claims go back months, however, suggesting their desired leverage over Israel has been minimal.
At the same time, the connections these parties draw between themselves and Hamas serve to reinforce a sentiment among many in the Israeli leadership — which Netanyahu articulated in May — that the war will not end until Hamas is eliminated and “Iran’s intentions to destroy us” have been frustrated. Bottom line, with concern less trained on the Israel-Hezbollah front, and a sense that broad regional escalation may not be in the cards for now, all eyes are back on the talks that didn’t end with the weekend’s events and the success of which most directly rests with the leadership of Israel and of Hamas.