KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
A U.S.-led peace initiative to end Sudan’s brutal civil war took place in Geneva over the last two weeks. But despite invitations and extensive international pressure, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) declined to send a delegation to Switzerland altogether, while the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) sent a delegation.
Rather than cancelling, diplomatic talks continued with co-hosts Saudi Arabia and Switzerland as well as observers Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the African Union and the United Nations. The result was the announcement of the Aligned for Advancing Lifesaving and Peace in Sudan (ALPS), which aims to expand access to humanitarian routes. Effectively, the initiative centers on creating joint international action on priority locations in Sudan’s humanitarian catastrophe.
So far, according to the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello, the ALPS has managed to secure agreements to open aid routes — including the Adré crossing along the border with Chad and the Dabbah Road leading from Port Sudan — as well as commitments from the RSF to implement a code of conduct among its fighters. However, there is still a lack of political will for a broader cessation of hostilities.
The U.S.-led talks in Geneva began as scheduled on August 14. But in all likelihood, direct talks between the SAF and the RSF were never anticipated.
Instead, a “proximity” model might have been used, where the mediation team holds meetings with each of the parties separately to bridge agreements. This is not unusual during high-intensity conflict or early phases of negotiations. In fact, a similar model was used by the U.N. to convene talks on humanitarian access just a few weeks earlier.
However, the SAF declined to send a delegation altogether, ending hopes for proximity talks. Sudanese authorities gave three official reasons for not sending a delegation.
First, Sudanese authorities expressed vocal opposition to the UAE’s inclusion in Geneva, given reports of the UAE’s military support to the RSF.
Second, Sudanese authorities took issue with the invitation being sent to the SAF rather than the Sovereign Council, which currently operates as the government of Sudan following the October 2021 coup d’etat. Leading up to the Geneva talks, the Sudanese government insisted that leader Abdel Al-Fattah Burhan — who heads both the SAF and the Sovereign Council — be invited in his capacity as Sudan’s de facto head of state rather than as the military chief of the SAF.
The difference might seem rhetorical, but an invitation to Burhan as the de facto head of state, rather than as a military leader, could have led to arguments over the perceived balance of institutional power, sovereignty and legitimacy between the SAF and RSF in the negotiations.
The SAF and RSF — and the international community — appear apprehensive about whether talks can lead to actual changes on the ground.
Third, Sudanese authorities were concerned about how any agreements in Geneva would be put into practice. Indeed, both the SAF and RSF — and the international community — appear apprehensive about whether talks can lead to actual changes on the ground.
Before the Geneva talks, the main attempts to resolve the conflict in Sudan were organized in Jeddah under the aegis of Saudi Arabia and the United States. Both the SAF and RSF attended meetings there and came to a series of agreements focused primarily on humanitarian access, recommitments to international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions, and short-term cessations of hostilities. But none of these were implemented.
Accordingly, questions were raised in many directions about how agreements reached in Geneva could have been guaranteed — especially absent a robust mechanism for compliance or a broader investment in monitoring, evaluation or enforcement.
Over the last few weeks, military operations have continued unabated across the country, particularly in Darfur, Kordofan, Sennar and Gezira. Civilians remain under siege amid heavy shelling in RSF-controlled areas, while the SAF has continued airstrikes. And reports suggest that every effort is being made to rearm and mobilize fighters to prepare for another round of costly, brutal violence.
So, while talks about talks were ongoing, the SAF and RSF may just be buying time at the expense of Sudan’s population since none of the armed parties (nor their foreign patrons) seem exhausted enough to come to talks in good faith.
However, as the fighting prolongs, the ability of warring parties to make comprehensive decisions on negotiations and implement commitments will continue to deteriorate. The SAF and RSF do not necessarily have centralized control over their broad coalitions, and the contradicting incentives among their fractured constituencies and allies (both inside and outside the country) will continue to shape engagement on peace talks or the lack thereof. Some of these critical stakeholders — mainly ethnic, religious, regional or financial actors — currently have a decisive influence behind the scenes. Their influence is only growing as the war goes on, and none of them agree with each other right now on a way to silence the guns and forge a path forward for Sudan.
It should be noted that talks are taking place beyond Geneva, and that the warring parties are not the only ones with a stake in this war. Sudanese civic forces have been developing their own proposals to end the crisis. And political movements, traditional civil society, professional groups, women and youth continue to actively consult and mobilize both in Sudan and among the diaspora.
Carving space for civic action as part of the broader peace process will be necessary, yet fraught. Many previous efforts have fallen prey to the country’s extreme polarization, which compels civic actors to “choose” between one of the two belligerents rather than staking out a separate space.
As the situation continues to unfold, a critical indicator to watch is the Sudanese authorities’ decision to open the Adrè crossing on the Sudan-Chad border for the delivery of aid.
Adrè was closed in February after Sudanese authorities claimed it was used to smuggle weapons to the RSF. But it remains a crucial avenue for humanitarian aid to reach Darfur. Efforts to both implement the decision to reopen the crossing and sustain it would not only save countless lives but serve as a testing ground for further aid cooperation among the full breadth of Sudanese society and between the warring parties.
Another critical indicator is whether the RSF allows the safe passage of aid into areas under their control. Previously, RSF fighters stole aid or obstructed its delivery across various routes inside the Darfur region. If this trend were to be reversed, it would indicate that the RSF is serious about implementing its new code of conduct and has the necessary control over its fighters to ensure it is enacted.
Overall, success related to humanitarian access should be measured not by how many trucks manage to get through the crossings, but by whether the aid they carry is used to feed hungry, vulnerable families for a sustained period. This would signal that opening Adrè is not just about creating the appearance of humanitarian cooperation, but that the involved parties are willing to actually allow aid to reach those in need.
On another level, Sudan’s civil war has features of a proxy conflict. Any negotiating track will require a prior agreement among the most interested neighboring parties, including Egypt, Saudia Arabia and the UAE. Notably, this round of talks in Geneva has managed to bring all these players into the room to focus on a handful of shared priorities.
Putting aside the warring parties themselves, bringing all these international actors under one roof should be seen as a positive outcome from the Geneva talks. And the establishment of the ALPS shows it’s possible to secure their buy-in and mutual coordination on important topics like humanitarian aid.
But critical questions remain: Is the ALPS format sustainable? Can it demonstrate progress on other priority issues? And can it address more difficult issues, especially where observers may disagree?
With the ALPS and other humanitarian efforts showing early progress, perhaps the time has come to shift priorities and focus (at least for now) on the suffering of the Sudanese people as they face a famine of unprecedented scale.
Perhaps the time has come to shift priorities and focus (at least for now) on the suffering of the Sudanese people.
Around this goal, one can build a pragmatic negotiating strategy that focuses on parsing belligerents’ territorial control as a means of coordinating aid. This is not an assessment of power, but an assessment of responsibility to deliver services. Such an approach will require bold diplomacy that moves away from endless and fruitless cease-fire talks (despite best efforts) and toward conversations on ensuring humanitarian access.
This strategy should incorporate the local humanitarian response structures, including the emergency response rooms, that continue to deliver aid in innovative ways through communal networks. The strategy can also provide a foundation to establish protection plans for local humanitarian actors.
In this strategy, responsibility will mainly fall on international donors as well as Sudan’s neighbors, on whom access for all humanitarian supplies depends. These neighbors have direct contacts and influence across Sudan’s vast frontier border and can help secure routes and infrastructure. Meanwhile, international donors — and regional countries that wish to offer more than token support — can build on the current humanitarian efforts to fill the supply pipeline. The key is to get aid to people before they’re forced to move in search of relief.
Options to put this new bold approach in practice could include:
Alex Rondos is a senior advisor with the Africa Center at USIP.
Hatim Badien is the country director for Sudan at USIP.