KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Since a 2020 clash between Indian and Chinese troops along their countries’ long disputed border, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), friction has mounted between the two Asian powers. But the two sides reached a deal in late October to de-escalate tensions. Although the details remain murky, India and China have already pulled back troops from two key flashpoint areas on the Himalayan frontier. Still, it remains to be seen what this means for the broader, frosty India-China relationship. The U.S. and India have significantly strengthened security ties in recent years, in part responding to China’s rise and aggressive behavior in the region. So, Washington will be watching closely to see what comes next.
USIP’s Andrew Scobell, Sameer Lalwani and Daniel Markey discuss why the two sides came to this deal now and what it means for tensions at the border, the broader relationship, and for U.S.-India ties.
Scobell: The border dispute between China and India has been a contentious issue in bilateral relations for more than six decades. Periodically the dispute has flared up, igniting tense confrontations and deadly clashes, including a short but inconclusive war in 1962. Although Beijing emerged victorious in the conflict, Chinese troops did not occupy additional territory but unilaterally withdrew to reestablish the status quo ante.
While the border dispute has defied resolution, both China and India have sought since the 1980s to stabilize the situation along their common frontier with some success. Nevertheless, tensions escalated in recent years and in 2020, a bloody clash in the Galwan Valley resulted in the deaths of at least two dozen soldiers (20 Indian and 4 Chinese).
The agreement represents a renewed effort by Beijing and New Delhi to achieve what Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar described as the “disengagement” of frontier forces and the resumption of peaceful patrolling by each side. While details are unclear, the deal eases bilateral tensions and allows both Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to look strong and statesman-like to their respective domestic audiences.
Why now? The agreement was announced just prior to the BRICS summit in Russia. Both China and India are members, and the agreement paved the way for the first official meeting between the two leaders since the 2020 battle. While Xi and Modi seem keen to patch things up and expand mutually beneficial economic interactions — China is India’s top trading partner — the border deal does not necessarily herald a fundamental strategic shift by Beijing and New Delhi. The border dispute is unlikely to be resolved any time soon as the two countries remain far apart on their respective territorial claims and unwilling to compromise.
Lalwani: The latest disengagement agreement appears to involve the pull back of Indian and Chinese troops and dismantlement of temporary infrastructure (e.g., tents and sheds) in two areas (Depsang and Demchok) of the disputed border region near Ladakh. Recent news reports seem to confirm that the disengagements have been completed and structures have been removed.
This follows previous disengagements in five other disputed parts of Ladakh over the past two years, which have resulted in buffer zones within what India perceives as its territory.
India also announced additional progress in these two latest disengagements in the form of an agreement on patrolling arrangements. Whereas India had been reported to have lost access to 65 patrolling points since China’s 2020 military incursions, some of this access will now be restored.
Both sides send patrols to signal their respective but overlapping territorial claims, and this has sometimes resulted in face-offs and clashes. Therefore, coordination of these patrols — or perhaps more accurately deconfliction — should help reduce the risk of confrontations and border clashes, and therefore the larger risk of accidental or inadvertent escalation between two nuclear powers.
Still, tensions will remain without at least de-escalation if not de-induction of forces. Indian leaders hope that successful disengagement can then lead to de-escalation that involves a mutual, further pull back of forces to designated areas that are at some distance from the disputed border, along with protocols to prevent re-engagement. Following that, India then aspires to a removal of forces down to a mutually agreed upon level, potentially reverting back to the pre-April 2020 regional force deployments before India added up to 50,000 troops and China perhaps 20,000 to the disputed border.
From India’s standpoint, de-escalation and de-induction are important steps to loosen what one former Indian foreign secretary has described as the “noose” around India’s neck that traps it into a losing strategy of unsustainably costly deployments in impossibly difficult terrain when more Indian military attention and assets need to be redirected to the maritime domain. It is unclear if China is equally invested in de-escalation as China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson has made no mention of de-escalation.
Lalwani: The question of whether this results in a broader thaw in the relationship hinges on actual implementation of military disengagement and patrolling agreements. Some analysts have noted we may not be able to fully evaluate implementation — including resumption of patrols and full dismantlement of forward-deployed infrastructure — until spring or summer of 2025.
Regardless of the actual military effects, it’s likely the announcement of this disengagement generates some political and economic effects. Politically, it seems to equip Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi with the argument to counter opposition claims that he has ceded territory to China and instead claim that India held its ground and denied Chinese occupation of Indian territory.
Strategically, India still seems inclined to maintain its competitive stance toward China … and even deepen its relationships with partners focused on countering Chinese power, like the Quad.
Economically, there is some expectation that this disengagement and thaw in relations will presage greater economic collaboration between India and its largest trading partner, China, which are both in search of greater economic stimulants. While China seeks out new rising markets like India’s, India may be open to Chinese foreign direct investments that can generate jobs, particularly in sectors like solar panel and battery manufacturing, and offset some of the trade imbalance between the two countries. For instance, the Chinese electronic vehicle maker BYD submitted a billion dollar investment proposal to build EVs in India over a year ago and is still awaiting a decision.
Strategically, India still seems inclined to maintain its competitive stance toward China in institutional, economic, technological and military domains, and even deepen its relationships with partners focused on countering Chinese power, like the Quad.
Even if India engages in new trade, investment and industrial partnerships, Delhi still leans in to the West as its natural technology partner and will protect its dual-use technology ecosystems from Chinese access. Beyond excluding TikTok and Huawei, India will likely try to scrutinize and sanitize critical and emerging technology domains such as information and communications, artificial intelligence and commercial space from Chinese capital and influence.
Even wildly successful disengagement does not automatically rebuild the India-China strategic relationship. Trust will not be so easily repaired. India has seen too much of Chinese wolf-warrior behavior and strategic contempt. China cannot easily put the toothpaste back in the tube.
The most likely scenario we can expect is some effort at stabilization of strategic competition, even military competition, equivalent to “guardrails” to prevent unintentional crises. That being said, it's worth considering — in the unlikely event China has a change in strategy — that this thaw has the potential to eventually run much deeper and much broader. Policymakers and analysts should at least be contemplating and gaming out the eventual tectonic shifts should this prove to be the unlikely beginnings of India and China moving toward a comprehensive border settlement.
Markey: The sharp deterioration in India-China relations after the 2020 Galwan Valley incident undoubtedly encouraged New Delhi to be more enthusiastic about its strategic partnership with Washington. It might therefore be tempting to assume that the recent LAC agreement between India and China would reverse the process of tightening India-U.S. ties.
This assumption is probably incorrect. Based on official statements, the LAC agreement with China is narrow and tactical; it will do little to ease the underlying geopolitical competition that drives their tensions along the LAC. Therefore, India will remain just as eager to pursue industrial, military and other cooperative ventures with the United States as it has over the past half decade, preparing itself for a long-term future of geopolitical competition with China.
Even in the less likely scenario that the LAC agreement marks the start of a deeper rapprochement between India and China, New Delhi is only likely to slow the momentum in its improved relations with Washington rather than to reverse course altogether. For instance, India would continue to have an interest in pursuing economic and commercial ventures with the United States even if it considers reopening its markets to greater Chinese participation. Similarly, no realistic security reassurances from Beijing would negate the value of U.S. arms deals already in the pipeline.
In addition to being unlikely, however, any Indian strategic recalibrations would happen very slowly. It will take years to undo the damage done to India-China relations. Washington will therefore have plenty of time to respond and recast its strategic partnership with New Delhi in ways that would preserve its essential features even if India attempts to smooth the roughest edges of its relationship with China.
Speculative futures aside, U.S. policymakers should appreciate that this India-China agreement is on balance good for the United States. It reduces the likelihood of a major military escalation between nuclear armed states and alleviates costly pressures on India to defend every inch of its land border at some expense to its maritime operations. Because Washington’s core goal for India is to enable its long-term rise as a strategic partner and friendly Asian counterweight to China, a deal that reduces immediate threats, costs and distractions without conceding much to China’s bullying is one to be welcomed more than feared.