KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
On September 15, one of the most important and contested legacies of Mexico’s then-President Andrés Manuel López Obrador — a constitutional reform that will see future judges being elected by popular vote — went into effect. After two failed attempts to pass the reform, López Obrador, colloquially known as AMLO, capitalized on his party Morena’s electoral victories earlier this year. These wins gave him control of the Chamber of Deputies, a near-qualified majority in the Senate and dominance in most state governorships and state-level legislatures. This ensured the continuity of his project with his protégée Claudia Sheinbaum, who was sworn in as Mexico’s first female president in October.
The reform’s approval has set a timeline leading to June 1, 2025, when Mexicans will vote to elect 1,500 new judges, covering positions from Supreme Court magistrates to district judges. This election will mark the beginning of a major judicial transformation, with up to 7,000 judges to be elected by popular vote by 2027. Judicial elections, however, are not new to Latin America; Bolivia implemented this model in 2009 under President Evo Morales, holding its first judicial elections in 2011, followed by elections in 2017 and an upcoming one in December 2024. These elections have a track record rich enough to understand the significant impact of these types of reforms not only on their respective institutions but also on their societies and political culture.
Judicial elections in Mexico may inadvertently undermine the very independence and accountability they seek to establish.
Judicial elections in Mexico may inadvertently undermine the very independence and accountability they seek to establish. While framed as a democratic reform, the election of judges could intensify political interference and erode public confidence in the judiciary. Bolivia’s experience with judicial elections, marked by increased politicization and widespread skepticism, offers a cautionary precedent that Mexico might follow. In both contexts, electing judges by popular vote could expose the judiciary to political and criminal influence, thereby compromising impartiality and institutional integrity. As such, these reforms may risk deepening, rather than alleviating, existing challenges not only to judicial systems marked by inefficiency and limited public trust but also to fragile democracies like Mexico and Bolivia.
Despite widespread national protests and strikes by judges, magistrates and court officials on September 11, the Mexican Congress narrowly passed López Obrador’s controversial judicial reform by just one vote in the Senate. Previously, Morena had been successful in approving such reform by an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies. In addition to introducing judicial elections, the reform also reduces the number of Supreme Court justices from 11 to nine, as well as their term period from 15 to 12 years, and creates a new judicial discipline tribunal that critics claim could put judges under political control.
López Obrador and his supporters contended that the direct election of federal judges and magistrates would eradicate corruption and elitism in the courts, allowing for an austere, independent justice system unaffected by private interests. As the former president described when announcing his initiative, “judges, magistrates and ministers should be elected by direct vote by the people, only the people can save the people.” However, critics argue that the judicial reform is more like an act of revenge: the Supreme Court halted many of López Obrador’s flagship reforms on energy, electoral institutions and military control over the civil National Guard by declaring them unconstitutional.
Under the new system, candidates for judicial office need only be lawyers with five years of experience and five recommendation letters. Candidates are pre-selected through a lottery, after which the executive, legislative and judicial branches propose the final pool of candidates. This system removes the meritocratic process previously required for judicial advancement, allowing political bodies greater control over judicial appointments. Consequently, any Mexican lawyer, regardless of experience, could potentially become a judge. While the system aims for inclusivity, it increases the risks of corruption, political influence and possibly organized crime interference. The lack of experience among judges may result in decisions swayed by political pressure rather than impartial assessments of the law and facts.
Such judicial uncertainty could also affect the private sector and foreign investment if there are doubts about the independence of the judicial system. U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Ken Salazar expressed on several occasions that the reform would affect not only Mexico’s democracy but also “the historic commercial relationship” between Mexico and the United States. Human rights activists would also be more exposed to impunity and abuse with less access to fair and unbiased justice. The reforms triggered a clash — and a potential constitutional crisis — between the legislative and judicial branches. The Supreme Court had planned to rule the new law unconstitutional, and in retribution, Congress had decided to debate an initiative rescinding the court’s authority to review laws. However, with Magistrate Alberto Perez Dayán’s vote, who decided this time to align with AMLO-appointed judges and reject the proposal, the judicial reform survived. However, Congress still voted in favor of limiting further the judicial branch’s power, shielding the new judicial reform from any other attempts by the Supreme Court to invalidate it.
Bolivia’s judicial reform emerged from a broad state overhaul during Morales’ administration (2006–2019). A new constitution transformed Bolivia into a “plurinational state” to reflect its cultural diversity and address historical inequalities from colonial times. This reform established new institutions, including a “National Agrarian Tribunal,” and restructured the Supreme and Constitutional Courts and the Judiciary Council. The government introduced judicial elections to enhance legitimacy in a system seen as corrupt, inefficient and unrepresentative of Bolivia's ethnic diversity. Similar to recent efforts in Mexico, these elections were intended to increase trust in the judicial system. The reforms aimed to create a justice system more aligned with Bolivia's multicultural identity.
In 2011, Bolivians voted for their magistrates for the first time after two years of preparation in elections deemed procedurally free and fair but marked by low public engagement. The constitution barred judicial candidates from campaigning, leaving electoral authorities to inform voters about candidates' qualifications. This restriction led to a process lacking democratic debate and sufficient candidate exposure for informed decision-making. Studies of the 2011 and 2017 elections revealed that candidates’ ballot positions, not their platforms, were key factors in election outcomes. Specifically, candidates listed first in 2011 and those in the upper-left quadrant in 2017 received the most votes.
The main challenges of judicial elections extend beyond election day, with significant issues arising during Congress’s pre-selection of candidates. In Bolivia, legislators conduct a pre-selection process to ensure representation of departments, women and Indigenous communities, as well as candidates' moral integrity — a step replicated in Mexico. However, the ruling party, Movement for Socialism, known by its Spanish acronym MAS, has held electoral dominance since 2005, leading opposition groups to view candidate lists as biased toward government loyalists. This perception of political interference has fostered mistrust, undermining the goal of judicial elections. As a result, many voters were either uninformed about the candidates or believed the elections were predetermined, leading to high numbers of blank and null votes. Consequently, voter turnout has been low, weakening the intended democratization of the judiciary.
This perception of political interference has fostered mistrust, undermining the goal of judicial elections.
The split within Bolivia’s MAS party between President Luis Arce’s followers and Morales’ supporters led to legislative gridlock, delaying approval of an electoral calendar and judicial candidates. When judges’ terms expired on December 31, 2023, without elections, Congress’s inaction created a constitutional vacuum, forcing an extension of the judges' mandates. This extension was seen as a “coup” by the opposition and Morales' faction, intensifying Bolivia’s ongoing political crisis. Protests erupted across major cities, exacerbated by the judiciary’s perceived alignment with Arce and delays on critical financial votes. Though an ad hoc negotiation set a new judicial election for December 1, 2024, the impasse has further fanned the flames of the current political crisis in Bolivia, which has seen this year a military coup attempt in June, a financial meltdown and frequent violent clashes between protesters, counterprotesters and the security forces throughout the country.
The experience of Bolivia with judicial elections could potentially provide a window into the future of Mexico’s judicial experiment. The political capture of the Bolivian judicial electoral process, which was intended to fulfill the promise of a more representative and democratic judiciary, had been anticipated by some critics. Direct elections of judges and magistrates became politicized, leading to a growing sentiment of mistrust of the judicial system. Additionally, polarizing actors elevated this conflict into violent confrontations on the streets, road blockages, attacks on the electoral and judicial institutions and even physical attacks on political leaders themselves.
Only 30 years ago, Mexico initiated its democratic transition, and the Supreme Court of Justice began independently issuing court rulings in accordance with the constitution rather than the will of the president or to satisfy other political interests. Despite the progress, Mexico’s democratic trajectory remains vulnerable to undue influence and pressure, suffering from high levels of impunity, enormous case backlog, and deficient and inadequate criminal investigations.
While judicial reform is indeed necessary to address these challenges, the current proposal not only risks the political capture of the justice system but also the capture by organized crime. Over the years, cartels co-opted local governments and members of Congress to protect their illicit interests. With such lenient requirements to become a judge or magistrate, it would not be surprising if they also tried to infiltrate and control the judicial branch to ensure continued impunity.
The Sheinbaum administration could have taken additional steps to prevent judicial elections from becoming a contested process by engaging in a constructive dialogue with the very branch it aims to transform. The counterproposal by Supreme Court Magistrate Juan Luis Gonzalez limited the judicial elections to members of the Supreme Court while keeping the rest of the judiciary under a meritocratic system. This could have been a better starting point for negotiations on a judicial system in need of reform, but the Sheinbaum administration decided to ignore the Supreme Court’s olive branch.
Regardless of how the judicial system is reformed, the United States should continue providing training and capacity building to federal and local judges and magistrates as a high bilateral priority. While the Biden administration fully respects Mexico’s sovereign right to engage in such judicial reforms, the State Department has been clear, without being interventionist, on its possible implications on shared interests in security and investment. Mexico is the leading U.S. trade partner, registering a total trade flow of $807 billion in 2023 and a critical security ally to combat the illicit drug trade and organized crime. The strength and independence of Mexico’s judicial system are central to delivering on the promise of a safer and more prosperous Mexico, with implications for U.S. national security.
In recent years, there has been a global trend that could potentially undermine judicial independence, eroding important checks and balances. In Israel, before the October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas, Israelis took to the streets in protest of an overhaul of the judicial system, which allowed for more political influence in the selection process of judges and limited the Supreme Court’s review of laws. Poland and Hungary approved similar reforms, which bestowed more power on the legislative branch to designate magistrates. In Guatemala, the judicial selection process was still tainted by choosing several judges linked to the “Pacto de Corruptos” — a term used to refer to politicians, businessmen, organized crime and members of the judicial system accused of acts of corruption. In El Salvador, two former electoral judges who favored President Nayib Bukele’s unconstitutional reelection were recently appointed to local courts. The United States should stay vigilant about a region shifting toward less democratic ways of governing.
Lucila Del Aguila Llausás is a senior program officer with USIP’s Latin America program.