KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Until late October, the big questions about China’s role in the Ukraine conflict centered around whether Beijing would choose to expand its support for Russia to include lethal aid, or if it might engage in more active peacemaking to end the conflict. Then, on November 4, the Pentagon confirmed that North Korea sent more than 10,000 troops to Russia’s Kursk oblast, where Ukraine had captured some territory earlier this year. Days later, the State Department confirmed that North Korean soldiers had begun fighting Ukrainian troops.
North Korean combat troops’ support of Russia’s aggression has put an urgent set of new questions on the table for China: How might Beijing respond to this move by its North Korean ally amid the deepening Russia-North Korea partnership that it signals? What might Beijing do in response to requests from Washington and its allies to press Pyongyang to pull its troops home? Will China be able to sustain the distance it has sought to maintain from the conflict while providing support for Moscow? Or will Pyongyang’s role in the conflict change Beijing’s approach to the war in Ukraine?
Since Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022, China has sought to preserve a veneer of neutrality vis-à-vis the war and to position itself as a prospective peace broker. Despite its strategic partnership with Russia, China has abstained from nearly all U.N. resolutions condemning the invasion and has refrained from providing Russia with lethal aid. Yet, China has also been the source of substantial economic and military support in the form of dual-use technologies for Russia. And, it has given Moscow implicit diplomatic backing by downplaying Russian aggression and echoing the Kremlin’s framing of its attack on Ukraine as a response to NATO expansion in its official communications.
At the same time, China has proposed a framework for a political settlement of the conflict, releasing a 12-point “Position on the Political Settlement of Ukraine” in February 2023. However, Beijing’s “peace plan” presented principles without a process and ultimately did little to galvanize diplomacy toward a cease-fire. Moreover, while the “peace plan” affirmed support for the principle of territorial integrity, it referred to the war as a “crisis” and did not call for Russia’s withdrawal from Ukrainian territory.
All of these developments have taken place against the backdrop of shifting security dynamics among China, Russia and North Korea, largely driven by new bilateral security arrangements. In June this year, Moscow and Pyongyang concluded a mutual defense treaty, ratified on November 12. China itself has an agreement on strategic coordination with Moscow, however the agreement does not extend to mutual defense.
China renewed its own alliance with North Korea in 2021, which does contain a mutual defense clause. The outcome of these developments is that today North Korea has mutual defense arrangements with both China and Russia as it did for a period during the Cold War. (The treaty between Pyongyang and Moscow was renounced by the latter in 1995.)
Since the news broke that North Korean troops were in Russia, China’s official response has been muted. When asked about China’s reaction to the presence of North Korean soldiers in Russia, for example, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson stated that the Russia-North Korea relationship is “a matter for themselves” as they are “two independent sovereign states.” The spokesman added that “China is not aware of the specifics of bilateral exchanges and cooperation between [North Korea] and Russia.”
China’s academic commentariat has had far more to say in reaction to the news, however. Responding to reports that North Korean troops have already come under fire in the Kursk region and that there have been casualties, some Chinese commentators questioned their capabilities, describing those sent to fight against Ukraine as “cannon fodder.” Other Chinese experts have focused on the potential strategic fallout for China and international security more broadly.
One key area of concern is how North Korea’s move may impact the Korean Peninsula, with one Chinese commentator warning that it could lead to a “fundamental shift in the security balance” there. Some experts commenting in Chinese state media have voiced fear that the acquisition of combat experience by North Korean troops could destabilize the Korean Peninsula's balance of power, potentially emboldening Kim Jong Un to attack the South.
In addition, some Chinese experts have noted that the presence of these troops on the Russia-Ukraine battlefield creates a link between security on China’s neighboring Korean peninsula to the war in Ukraine in unprecedented and unpredictable ways. They speculate that it could lead to Russian involvement in a potential Korean Peninsula contingency — including Russia leveraging its nuclear capabilities — more likely.
Given the multifaceted implications of North Korea’s behavior for China’s interests, official Chinese reticence on the presence of North Korean troops in Russia is likely a move to buy time as it wrestles with how best to respond. For one, China’s core security interests lie in preventing instability along its borders and advancing its irredentist claims in the Western Pacific. In addition, China remains heavily reliant on trade for its economic growth, including with the major economies of the United States and Europe, as well as South Korea, with which trade was already in sharp decline.
The presence of troops from North Korea, China’s sole formal ally, makes it more difficult for China to persuade other countries that it is not party to Russian aggression.
China finds itself with the unpalatable choice of either supporting or tolerating North Korean troop deployments to Russia or opposing them. The former could deepen a Cold War-style divide between a U.S.-Japan-South Korea-Europe bloc and a China-Russia-North Korea partnership. The latter risks driving North Korea closer to Russia or undermining China’s own “closer-than-ever” relations with Russia.
At the same time, the presence of troops from North Korea, China’s sole formal ally, makes it more difficult for China to persuade other countries that it is not party to Russian aggression. China has sought to maintain economic ties with leading economies, including Europe, the U.S., and South Korea, which remain among its key export markets. To date, China has been assiduous in its efforts to avoid anything that could be seen as offering direct support to Russia’s military activities as this would almost surely see it hit with sanctions.
Amid China’s challenge to the West’s global leadership, Beijing may welcome the potential that North Korean troops could escalate the conflict in ways that appear to be to Russia’s advantage. But there are also downsides to a more protracted and intense conflict. The sustained involvement of North Korean troops on the battlefield not only makes it harder for China to preserve its distance from the war but also increases the risks to China that its alliance with North Korea may draw it into security crises not of its choosing. It could further strengthen NATO and other U.S.-led alliances. As scholars from the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies contended ahead of the June 2024 Putin-Kim summit, tightening Russia-North Korea ties could lead the United States to further strengthen its alliances in Northeast Asia.
China now may consider that it needs to prepare for the risk that the U.S. could use North Korea’s involvement in the war in Ukraine as a pretext for actions against North Korea. It also must weigh the possibility that North Korea, emboldened by its alliance with Moscow, could take further actions that ultimately embroil China in conflict either on the Korean Peninsula or beyond. Yet, China does not want to sever its own alliance with North Korea as it sees that as an important channel of influence on Pyongyang nor does it want to suggest that a rift exists between it and North Korea, which it worries the U.S. and its allies could seek to exploit with uncertain outcomes.
China is likely to try to have it all ways. Senior Biden administration officials indicate that they have engaged in “robust” discussions with Chinese diplomats about the need for Beijing to use its leverage over Pyongyang to encourage it to “to curb these activities,” in Secretary Blinken’s words. China’s response has been to repeat its support for “peace talks and political settlement,” stating that it will “continue to play a constructive role to this end,” according to a Chinese embassy spokesman in Washington. Even as North Korean troops fight on in Russia, China will continue to pursue stable economic ties with Europe and other major trading partners to improve its stumbling economy. It will also engage in periodic high-level diplomacy with the United States on trade and security — but its goal will be to tread water rather than achieve a breakthrough in relations.
At the same time, Beijing will seek to preserve ambiguity about its own capacity to influence North Korea, focusing its attention on curbing or managing actions from North Korea that might complicate its own security, generate instability on the Korean Peninsula or weaken its relationship with Russia. Thus, it would be surprising to see Beijing take bold steps to address North Korean involvement in the Ukraine conflict.
In short, Beijing will likely seek to continue to pursue its cautious approach, refraining from direct involvement in the issue of North Korea’s support for Russian forces. This could change if Pyongyang escalates the Ukraine conflict in ways that fall outside the scope of their mutual defense pledge, such as by deploying troops directly into Ukrainian territory. For now, China’s response will be to aim to maintain a delicate balance that accounts for each of these complex considerations.