China and Ukraine: Pulling Its Weight with Russia or Potemkin Peacemaker?

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • For meaningful movement toward a just peace in Ukraine, China could play a critical, constructive role.
  • Recent events suggest Beijing may be seeking to posture itself in anticipation of a new initiative to end the war.
  • But it appears that Beijing continues to talk the talk but not walk the walk.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • For meaningful movement toward a just peace in Ukraine, China could play a critical, constructive role.
  • Recent events suggest Beijing may be seeking to posture itself in anticipation of a new initiative to end the war.
  • But it appears that Beijing continues to talk the talk but not walk the walk.

On Thursday, China’s ambassador, Ma Shengkun, presented his credentials at Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry. Ma, a career diplomat with a background in arms control, replaces Fan Xianrong who had held the post for the past four and a half years. While a diplomatic reshuffle was due, the timing of the turnover and the selection of Ma, in tandem with other recent developments, suggest that China discerns a gradual gathering of momentum for a peace process or truce talks in coming months. In short, Beijing may be seeking to posture itself in anticipation of a new initiative to end — or at least pause — the war in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s deputy foreign minister, Yevhen Perebyinis, received copies of credentials from Ma Shengkun, China’s newly appointed ambassador to Ukraine. (Ukraine Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Ukraine’s deputy foreign minister, Yevhen Perebyinis, received copies of credentials from Ma Shengkun, China’s newly appointed ambassador to Ukraine. (Ukraine Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

A Force for Peace?

While admittedly speculative, this prompts the larger question of whether China constitutes a serious force working to halt the war or is merely going through the motions. Beijing has formally tasked a special envoy, Li Hui, who is ostensibly engaged in “shuttle diplomacy” in pursuit of a “political settlement” to what China calls the “Ukraine Crisis.” In February 2023, Beijing issued a 12-point declaration of principles on the Ukraine war hyped as China’s “peace plan.” However, the document lacks any concrete or meaningful proposals and has gained little traction since its release 18 months ago. China declined to participate in the international Ukraine peace summit held in Lucerne, Switzerland in June 2024 and urged other countries not to attend. Some 90 states and international organizations did choose to attend.

Russian dictator Vladimir Putin shows no signs of wavering on Ukraine and appears committed to continuing to prosecute his war of aggression. Certainly, Beijing enjoys a close relationship with Moscow and to date China has refrained from publicly criticizing Russia. Moreover, Beijing has provided significant non-lethal military assistance to Moscow and through robust bilateral trade is essentially bankrolling Russia’s war effort.

Furthermore, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Putin maintain an enduring personal relationship — the two have met with each other more frequently than either man has with any other world leader. Hence, China is an excellent position to apply meaningful pressure or significant influence on Russia to suspend hostilities and pursue a negotiated solution. However, to date there is no evidence to indicate this has happened.

China is an excellent position to apply meaningful pressure or significant influence on Russia to suspend hostilities and pursue a negotiated solution.

Indeed, events of recent days suggest Beijing continues to talk the talk but not walk the walk. The appointment of Ma underscores China’s continued desire to maintain a cordial relationship with Ukraine despite tacit support and material backing for Russia’s invasion. Noticeably, the Chinese embassy announcement on Ma’s arrival did not mention Russia or the war. This official statement reflects the Chinese government’s general approach in discussing the war — that is, to discuss it in generalities or not at all.

On Wednesday, in a conversation with Brazilian President Lula da Silva, Xi reportedly called for “more voices committed to peace to pave the way for a political solution to the Ukraine crisis.” And on Monday, when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Brazil, the resulting Chinese statement flatly reported that the “two sides also exchanged views on issues such as the Ukraine crisis and the situation on the Korean Peninsula.”

Whether Ukraine was merely mentioned in passing and/or whether the topic of Ukraine was linked to the subject of tensions between North and South Korea is unclear. There is little doubt that Beijing is not thrilled with the mutual defense treaty Moscow and Pyongyang signed this summer and alarmed about North Korean troops being deployed to the western frontline Russian oblast of Kursk, seemingly in preparation for employment in the Ukraine war. This development raises the specter of escalation and adverse impact on China, which has its own mutual defense treaty with North Korea (Pyongyang is Beijing’s sole official military ally).

Beijing’s Quiet Disquiet Over the Ukraine War

Beijing’s ostensibly neutral stance on Russian aggression belies disquiet among Chinese leaders over the ongoing war in Ukraine. While China is unlikely to break with Russia over the bloody conflict, Beijing is focused on projecting the image of a responsible non-aligned great power desiring friendship with all countries and committed to finding a negotiated end to the war. China is not happy that the war is dragging on and remains concerned over Russia’s decision to insert thousands of North Korean troops into the conflict.

From his new post in Kyiv, Ambassador Ma reportedly stated that “China and Ukraine are traditional friendly partners … and I am full of confidence in the prospects for the deepened development of bilateral relations.” The prerequisite for any deepening in Beijing-Kyiv relations would be an end to Moscow’s war against Ukraine. China has noteworthy economic interests in Ukraine and the conflict is antithetical to these, as well as China’s significant economic engagement with other European states. Indeed, Beijing’s relations with most of these capitals are strained because of the war and China’s stance of pro-Russian neutrality. With Ma’s arms control background he could potentially play some role in whispering military de-escalation options to Ukraine.  

Beijing’s recent rhetoric and actions may have been triggered by the presumption that the incoming U.S. administration, which takes office in January 2025, will launch a new initiative to end the war in Ukraine. Although an inherently speculative exercise, this essay raises the critical question of whether China can be a real force for peace in Ukraine or remains merely a posturing “great power lite” capable of little more than spouting high-minded platitudes and delivering grandiose but empty gestures.  

In the final analysis, for meaningful movement toward a just peace in Ukraine, China’s involvement seems crucial. Without a significant change on the battlefield or a push from Beijing, Moscow is unlikely to be open to good-faith negotiations aimed at bringing an end to the war in Ukraine. Unfortunately, such a Chinese push has yet to materialize.


PHOTO: Ukraine’s deputy foreign minister, Yevhen Perebyinis, received copies of credentials from Ma Shengkun, China’s newly appointed ambassador to Ukraine. (Ukraine Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).

PUBLICATION TYPE: Analysis