Summary

The Oslo Accords reached by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel in 1993-95 ushered into existence the Palestinian Authority and inspired efforts to build autonomous structures for Palestinian self-rule. Since the earliest days of the Palestinian Authority, a varied group of Palestinians has sought to lay the practical foundation for Palestinian statehood through the construction of strong institutions with clear (and generally liberal) legal bases. These efforts have been sometimes frustrated by the patterns of governance favored by the Palestinian leadership and by the restrictions and priorities imposed by the process of negotiating a settlement with Israel. Out of this struggle a diverse coalition of Palestinian reformers has arisen. Some of the reformers are members of the elected Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and have sought to use their positions to build a solid legal basis for institutions such as the Palestinian judiciary and civil service. A second group of reformers consists of prominent NGO leaders, who have both cooperated and competed in proposing various reforms. A third group is made up of intellectuals, especially those associated with universities, who have developed many of their own proposals. A fourth group consists of political party activists who have provided some support for reform, though it has often been tangential to their main agendas.

Given their diversity, it should not be surprising that the reformers have rarely acted as a unified group and indeed have often displayed deep rivalries. Remarkably, however, they have coalesced around a solid, detailed, and well-articulated agenda for reform, concentrating their efforts in the following seven areas.

• Constitution writing
  Reformers have focused on two projects to draft Palestinian constitutions. The first, the Basic Law for the Palestinian Authority, was passed in 1997 by the PLC. It was not signed by Yasir Arafat until 2002 and remains imperfectly implemented. The second has been a draft constitution for a Palestinian state, produced by a PLO committee in 2001 but not yet endorsed by any authoritative Palestinian body. Both documents might seem at first glance quixotic in the context of ongoing violence and political instability, but many domestic and international actors seem to have come to the opposite conclusion: The road out of the current conflict must pass through the sort of institutional reform that a constitution can enable. The two documents are carefully designed to contain the executive branch and hold it accountable to clear legal standards. Recently, some reformers have begun to feel that containment is insufficient and have sought to transfer authority from the president to a prime minister.
• Defining the relationship between the PLO and the Palestinian Authority
  The Oslo Accords created a Palestinian Authority distinct from the far older Palestine Liberation Organization, but the leadership of the two bodies has overlapped in ways that frustrate reformers for several reasons. First, senior Palestinian leaders-- most notably Arafat himself--can slide between PLO and PA bases for their authority, vitiating institutional mechanisms of accountability. Second, reformers have felt that the continuing influence of the PLO institutional culture--involving revolutionary ideology, a focus on security, and secretiveness--has undermined PA institution building. Although they agree that Palestinians throughout the world (represented by the PLO) should have some voice in Palestinian governance, reformers have sought to ensure that the current institutional ambiguities do not survive a declaration of statehood.
• Public finances
  A fundamental problem for PA critics has been the opaque nature of PA finances, which have been micromanaged by President Arafat and not subject to meaningful oversight by any public body. Large portions of the PA budget have not been carried on the official books but are run instead through secret channels and accounts. Not only are PA finances partly hidden, but also many economic activities have not been subject to oversight. The Palestinian Authority has lacked any kind of systematic policies on public expenditures. Hiring and personnel policies have been loosely defined and are often not followed even when defined. And reformers have questioned the fiscal priorities of the Palestinian Authority, calling for reductions in security expenditures and increases in health and education. Reformers did make some progress in laying the legal groundwork for more transparent finances and, supported by separate efforts by international donors, obtained far fuller disclosure of the PA budget and holdings.
• The rule of law and judicial reform
  Reformers in the PLC have managed to pass a series of liberal laws on subjects ranging from public meetings to the independence of the judiciary. In most Arab political systems a solid legal foundation has been laid for authoritarian practice. In the case of the Palestinian Authority, the emerging framework is more liberal but actual practice remains authoritarian. Many parts of the new liberal legal framework remain unimplemented or unenforced. Reformers have also sought to build a more professional and independent judiciary and to dismantle State Security Courts, which were constructed to handle politically sensitive cases.
• Corruption
  The Palestinian Authority quickly earned an international reputation for corruption. Many of the Palestinian Authority's international critics (along with critics of the Oslo Agreements more generally) have relied heavily on this reputation in calling into question the international assistance program to the Palestinian Authority and even the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority itself. Fairly specific inquiries into the nature of corruption in the Palestinian Authority have revealed that the problem involves weak institutions and unclear procedures as much as it does venality. However, such a distinction has generally been lost in broader international and domestic discussions.
• The structure and practices of the security services
  The agenda of PA reformers has focused on the loose restraints placed on the security services and their operation. The mechanisms of democratic accountability, though existing in some matters under the Palestinian Authority's jurisdiction, have been largely inoperative with regard to the security services. Reformers have also faulted the PA leadership for failing to develop any legal framework to govern the structure and operation of the security services. They have also looked askance at the harsh methods employed by the security services and their involvement in matters unconnected with security, such as tax collection and dispute resolution.
• Elections and local governance.
  Finally, PA reformers have focused some of their attention on building democratic mechanisms through the electoral process. The most important step in granting the Palestinian Authority domestic legitimacy was the election of the PA president and the PLC in 1996. The first law passed by the PLC governed local elections. Although Yasir Arafat signed the law, those elections have yet to be held. Reformers have also sought to democratize other structures of Palestinian society, such as political parties, NGOs, and professional associations, but with only limited success.

Reformers have not been without impact. They have often been dominant in discussions among intellectuals, and they have exerted real influence on the formal legal framework of the Palestinian Authority. But they have had far less success in translating these achievements into actual reforms in Palestinian governance. In general, the accomplishments of the reformers have been real but limited by the patterns that have governed the Palestinian Authority since the beginning: the leadership is pliant, attempting to please all parties at once;most procedures are ad hoc and unclear; those rules that are clear are still bent and even broken;and chains of command and responsibility are obscure. PA reform has often foundered precisely because of the problems reformers have sought to overcome: the weak institutionalization and legal ambiguities that afflict all PA operations.

International actors have shown varying degrees of interest in PA reform, and their proposals, while sometimes similar to those of domestic reformers, are not identical. The United States displayed only limited interest in reform until 2002, when it moved the issue to the center of its Palestinian policy. Israel has also focused far more on security arrangements than on governance. European actors have shown a more consistent interest in reform and generally have an agenda close to that developed by Palestinian reformers. Arab states have displayed an interest in reform only insofar as it is necessary to pursue diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict with Israel.

Prospects for the success of reform have seemed brightest whenever the domestic agenda and the international community's agenda have been linked. Such linkages were being built in the year prior to the eruption of the second intifada and have again been apparent since April 2002. Since then, however, the cause of reform has faced a difficult conundrum: On the one hand, real progress in reform seems impossible without some diminution of the conflict with Israel and some relaxation of Israeli restrictions on travel in the West Bank and Gaza. On the other hand, such political changes seem unlikely unless robust Palestinian institutions--the kind that the reformers have worked to build--can guide Palestinian society. In short, reform and an end to violence hold each other hostage.

About the Author

Nathan J. Brown is professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University. He is author of Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 2001); The Rule of Law in the Arab World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Peasant Politics in Modern Egypt (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990). His book Palestinian Politics since the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine will be published in 2003 by the University of California Press.

His research on Palestinian politics has been supported by a grant from the United States Institute of Peace and by a Fulbright grant.