USIP’s Andrew Wilder comments on President Barack Obama’s call to draw down U.S. forces and why achieving durable peace in Afghanistan is essential for U.S. national security.

June 23, 2011

President Barack Obama’s June 22nd speech outlined his decision to withdraw 10,000 U.S. troops between July and the end of 2011, and the remaining 23,000 of the troops that “surged” to Afghanistan in 2010 by September 2012. These figures and timeframes, which had remained a relatively well-kept secret by Washington standards, represent a faster pace than his military commanders (including General David Petraeus) had called for, but a slower pace than some of his civilian advisers and many of the war-weary public had hoped. The withdrawal numbers and timeframe clearly reflect what the president feels best balances the military and political objective of “responsibly ending” the war in order “to focus on nation building here at home.”

In justifying this decision President Obama emphasized policy continuity, and that he was doing precisely what he said he would do in his December 2009 West Point speech. In that speech, he committed to send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan “to seize the initiative” and build Afghan capacity to enable a transition, and to then start bringing the troops home in 18 months. Without explicitly saying “mission accomplished,” the president Wednesday evening emphasized that the strategy he outlined at West Point was working, especially in terms of progress toward achieving the core U.S. goal of “disrupting, dismantling and defeating” al-Qaida, and that it was therefore possible to start drawing down troops levels and transitioning the lead security role over to the Afghan National Security Forces.

While President Obama’s speech was able to articulate a compelling narrative of the success of our military strategy, strikingly absent was a comparable success story in terms of achieving political objectives. There’s an Afghan saying that “it takes two hands to clap,” and it’s clear that a military strategy alone cannot lead to durable peace in Afghanistan. Simply capturing and killing more mid-level insurgent commanders and clearing areas of the Taliban will have little strategic benefit if the Afghan government cannot step in and provide the public with a better alternative to Taliban rule. The corrupt and predatory behavior of local strongmen who are appointed into key government positions is a major factor driving many Afghans to support, or not actively oppose, the Taliban. So while I applaud the president’s commitment to “build a partnership with the Afghan people that endures,” partnerships only work effectively and endure when there is some measure of shared objectives underpinning them and a clear strategy to guide them.

A second issue that seriously threatens the military gains, but which received only passing reference in the president’s speech, is the issue of safe havens for militant groups in Pakistan. President Obama did mention that the U.S. “will never tolerate a safe haven for those who aim to kill us,” and that “we will work with the Pakistani government to root out the cancer of violent extremism,” but the need to make this point highlights that it’s an area where limited progress has been made.

For several years, USIP has been supporting a wide variety of program activities inside Afghanistan as well as analysis to better understand and help promote political reconciliation and a peaceful end to conflict in Afghanistan.

I was therefore pleased to hear the president state: “We do know that peace cannot come to a land that has known so much war without a political settlement,” and to clarify that “America will join initiatives that reconcile the Afghan people, including the Taliban,” as long as they “break from al-Qaida, abandon violence, and abide by the Afghan Constitution.”

If the U.S. succeeds in clarifying its commitment to a politically negotiated end to the conflict, incentivizing regional actors to support and not sabotage a peace process, and realigning our military strategy so that military force is designed to help promote rather than prevents negotiations, I would concur with the president’s cautiously optimistic assessment regarding a political settlement that “we have reason to believe that progress can be made.”

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