Posted: March 1, 2010

The seven-year conflict in Darfur, Sudan has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Darfuris and left millions homeless, amid clashes among various rebel groups, government forces and allied militias.

In what could be a step towards ending that conflict, the Sudanese government and the Darfuri rebel group, Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), signed a cease-fire agreement on February 23, 2010.

What does this agreement mean for Sudan’s future stability and securing peace in Sudan?

USIP’s Jon Temin and Chester Crocker, former USIP Chairman and professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, answer questions about the implications of the cease-fire for Sudan and the region, as well as the U.S. role in Sudan in promoting a peaceful resolution to the Darfur conflict.

• Is this cease-fire agreement a major breakthrough?
• What is the significance of the deal with the JEM? Why was this deal made with the JEM and not any other Darfuri rebel groups?
• What are some of the key elements of this agreement?
• What were the incentives, or motives, for each side to agree to a cease-fire?
• Did the U.S. play a role in facilitating this agreement? What has been the role of the U.S. in Sudan over the last year?
• What does this mean for Sudan’s future prospects of stability?
• How do you view the overall prospects for peace and stability in Sudan?
• How is USIP working to promote stability and conflict resolution in the country?
• Why should the U.S. care about Darfur and Sudan in general? What is at stake for the U.S.?

Is this cease-fire agreement a major breakthrough?

Jon Temin: It remains to be seen whether this agreement signals real progress – past agreements concerning Darfur have not delivered peace. Those past agreements include a "goodwill agreement" between the government of Sudan (GoS) and JEM in February 2009 that did not result in meaningful progress. If this agreement remains solely between the GoS and JEM it is difficult to be optimistic. If additional rebel groups, most notably the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, can be brought into the negotiations, that may signal real progress.

This is really a pre-agreement – an agreement to negotiate a more detailed agreement. Those negotiations should start soon, and there is said to be a March 15th deadline to conclude the negotiations, but it remains unclear whether other rebel movements will negotiate, and whether JEM will continue to insist that it be the only rebel movement negotiating with the GoS. That position does not seem to be conducive to progress.

An important question concerning this agreement and the ongoing negotiations is who really represents the people of Darfur. JEM is the strongest rebel movement militarily but is widely understood to have a fairly narrow base of popular support. The SLM/A’s Abdel-Wahid maintains significant grassroots support, especially in some of the camps for the internally displaced, but refuses to negotiate. It remains to be seen how the interests of a wide range of Darfuris will be represented in negotiations, and will be important to avoid reaching an agreement that only benefits elites.

What is the significance of the deal with the JEM? Why was this deal made with the JEM and not any other Darfuri rebel groups?

Chester Crocker: We do not yet know the significance of this deal. Deals get made and unmade overnight in such situations because they tend to be based on the chemistry among the top people at any given moment. Having JEM as a 'partner' is important in the context of northern Sudanese politics, given its roots and history of Islamist links. It is also the party that launched a bold attack hundreds of miles across the country up to the outskirts of Khartoum itself.

What are some of the key elements of this agreement?

Jon Temin: The agreement is only three pages long and rather vague. The most concrete aspects of it concern the cease-fire between JEM and the GoS and the release of JEM prisoners held by the GoS (those prisoners include the half-brother of JEM’s leader). The agreement talks about integrating JEM soldiers into the Sudanese Armed Forces, JEM transforming into a political party and JEM participating "in power at all levels of government."

It also says the Government of Sudan "shall commit itself to fairly compensate the refugees, and displaced persons and all those who have been affected by the conflict in Darfur and shall also commit itself to ensuring the right of voluntary return for the refugees and displaced persons to their original areas and establish service providing institutions and infrastructure with a view to securing a decent life for them." These are the key issues for the people in Darfur, but with such complex issues the devil is in the details.

What were the incentives, or motives, for each side to agree to a cease-fire?

Jon Temin: JEM was likely motivated to make this agreement in part because of the recent rapprochement between Sudan and Chad. The Chadian government is widely understood to have supported JEM for several years in a proxy war with Sudan. The recent thawing of relations between Sudan and Chad likely means reduced Chadian support to JEM, which weakens their position.

The GoS seems eager for the nationwide elections scheduled for April to be seen as credible, which may have motivated their agreement with JEM. But many questions remain about the viability of those elections in Darfur.

Did the U.S. play a role in facilitating this agreement? What has been the role of the U.S. in Sudan over the last year?

Jon Temin: The agreement appears to be the result of engagement between Sudan, Chad and JEM, without any outside mediation. The U.S. has publicly supported the agreement and the U.S. special envoy to Sudan, General Scott Gration, was present for the signing. Bringing peace to Darfur is one of the three primary goals set forth in the U.S. policy towards Sudan, and the U.S. will likely remain closely involved in the negotiations that will follow this agreement. The U.S. has also been active in efforts to unify some of the fragmented rebel movements.

What does this mean for Sudan’s future prospects of stability?

Jon Temin: A significant concern is the implications of this agreement for the April elections. Already JEM has called for those elections to be postponed, but that National Elections Commission says they will proceed as planned. If the elections don’t happen in April the earliest they could feasibly happen is in November; the rainy season starts around May and could make the logistics of an election extremely challenging. But, another problem to rescheduling elections for November is that the referendum on whether Southern Sudan remains part of a united Sudan or secedes is planned just a few months later, in January 2011. The Southerners are strongly resistant to moving the referendum date; the referendum on its own could significantly destabilize Sudan if it is not conducted properly.

On the other hand, if this agreement leads to real progress in Darfur - and if more parties participate in negotiations, possibly including civil society representatives - then there is the possibility that it could bring a period of horrific violence in Darfur to a close.

How do you view the overall prospects for peace and stability in Sudan?

Chester Crocker: The prospects are not good. In fact the country could be headed over the edge of a cliff over the next 12 months unless Sudanese parties sober up and external actors decide to pick up the pieces of the messy Comprehensive Peace Agreement process and create a coherent, unified context for shepherding the next stages.

How is USIP working to promote stability and conflict resolution in the country?

Jon Temin: USIP focuses its Sudan work on both Darfur and relations between the North and South. Our series of electoral violence prevention workshops are helping Sudanese understand the causes of election-related violence and strategies to prevent it. In the "Three Areas" in the middle of the country we are building grassroots conflict management skills and supporting local peace agreements through a series of workshops. We also work closely with the Darfur diaspora in North America, including a recent diaspora consultation that focused on the Darfur peace process.

Why should the U.S. care about Darfur and Sudan in general? What is at stake for the U.S.?

Chester Crocker: I would reverse the order. Darfur is a subset and derivative of the larger equities in Sudan's troubled peace process. What is at stake is: (a) the sunk costs of major diplomatic and bilateral and multilateral assistance efforts over three U.S. administrations; (b) the future unity or dismembership of Africa's largest state. If separation occurs, whether it can be managed more or less peacefully or becomes another major African conflict potentially engulfing the Horn and East African sub-regions, including the Nile River Valley states; (c) helping millions of Sudanese, in Darfur, the South and throughout the country restore, rebuild and heal themselves. The conflicts in Sudan - like those in Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo - Africa's biggest countries - affect the larger neighborhood and the chances for advancing the full range of U.S. interests therein.