“Somebody from a developing country said to me, ‘What we get from China is an airport. What we get from the United States is a lecture.’ ” — Larry Summers, former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury

Amid ongoing U.S.-China competition, Summers’ observation encapsulates one of the key reasons for China’s success across the Global South — particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean. China delivers when it comes to building infrastructure, whether it’s airports and sports stadiums or 5G networks courtesy of Huawei and ZTE.

Argentine President Alberto Fernandez and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet to discuss deepening their two countries’ partnership Beijing, China, Oct. 18, 2023. (Facebook/Casa Rosada)
Argentine President Alberto Fernandez and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet to discuss deepening their two countries’ partnership Beijing, China, Oct. 18, 2023. (Facebook/Casa Rosada)

Meanwhile, the United States too often is lecturing about human rights and the need for democratization. While the U.S. goals are laudable, a lack of accompanying concrete benefits means they are seen more as hectoring than as useful policy approaches.

Worse, when American and Western nations do provide tangible investments, they are accompanied by Western environmental, social and governance requirements. By contrast, there often are far fewer immediate strings attached to Chinese aid.

Not surprisingly, China has made major inroads into Latin America and the Caribbean. As the House Foreign Affairs Committee notes, in 2021 alone, “Chinese state-owned companies … funded $11.3 billion worth of projects in South American countries.”

Huawei is one of the main providers of 5G equipment for Brazil and Mexico and currently is bidding on 5G infrastructure projects across the rest of Central and South America. Huawei Marine Networks, meanwhile, plans to lay submarine cables (which can carry substantially more data than satellite systems) between Brazil and the African countries of Cape Verde and Cameroon.

China also has outsize positions in mining in South America — controlling 100% of Peruvian iron ore production, for example — and has positioned itself to control key resources associated with electric vehicles. China also has longstanding contracts with nations such as Bolivia for their lithium production, a key part of batteries.

For the United States, this is a radically different challenge than the one presented by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. U.S.-Soviet competition was largely one undertaken in the military arena. And while the Soviets sought to suborn and undermine various governments across Latin America, its appeal was inherently limited. Regimes like the Castros in Cuba and the Sandanistas in Nicaragua had little to offer their population beyond dialectics and ideological diatribes. Few populations were better off under Soviet-style communist regimes.

But the People’s Republic of China (PRC), through construction of airports and railways, as well as the provision of cheap advanced technology, has far broader appeal, not only to governments eager to modernize their nation but also to local populations that can see the benefits of access to cell phones and the Internet. Moreover, unlike Moscow, Beijing has shown little tendency to remake local governments in its own image. Whether democracies or dictatorships, Beijing has proven an equal-opportunity trading partner.

And a military role may not be far off. The PRC has already been negotiating the establishment of a joint training facility in Cuba, which would put Chinese troops barely 100 miles from American shores. Meanwhile, it has also been exploring the possibility of selling advanced fighter jets to Argentina.

For the United States, it is essential that it implement a comprehensive strategy to counter these major Chinese advances in the region. America’s southern flank already has proven porous, whether to illegal immigrants (including Chinese) or to fentanyl. South American states are major trading partners, but as Presidents Lula da Silva, Nicolas Maduro and the late Hugo Chavez have demonstrated, their leaders can also choose to align with Beijing. It is no accident that Argentina is one of the new BRICS states.

The American response, however, must go beyond periodic speeches and military exercises. American investment remains sought after, even preferred, because it is far more transparent and less likely to incur debt traps. American assistance in helping local states review contracts and deals with the Chinese, in this regard, would forestall some of the worst Chinese practices, whether it be usurious interest rates or crippling terms that mortgage national sovereignty.

American assistance in cyber security would help many states retain their intellectual property, while limiting the ability of China to exploit the open digital border.

Above all, it is essential that the United States mobilize its resources — financial, intellectual, political and cultural — to create a 21st century version of the Alliance for Progress, rooted in the belief that cooperation between North and South America will provide far greater benefits for all than anything an authoritarian, mercantilist China can offer.

This op-ed was originally published by the Miami Herald.


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