KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
On July 28, Venezuela held one of the most consequential elections in its history. The country’s political opposition, led by Maria Corina Machado, overcame popular disillusionment, political divides and a rigged electoral system to earn a landslide victory for its unity candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia. According to one civil society group, estimates “extrapolated from the official vote count receipts” from a representative sample of local voting centers give González 66% of the vote. Venezuela’s opposition met the moment with an inspired pro-democracy campaign.
Yet President Nicolás Maduro has refused to accept defeat. Instead, he ordered the National Election Council to proclaim his victory while blocking a transparent vote count, launching Venezuela into crisis. International calls to release the full vote tallies have not stopped Maduro’s post-election crackdown — 25 people have been killed so far, with over 1,000 more arbitrarily detained. Security forces have erected checkpoints to root out activists, issued thousands of arrest warrants, and marked the homes of suspected dissidents. Many activists, including Machado, are in hiding.
Still, Venezuela’s democratic opposition has not given up. Instead, Machado and her allies are mobilizing a nonviolent action campaign to contest fraud and reclaim their hard-earned democratic victory. Machado has promised to endure “until the end,” and, so far, she and González have not backed down.
If the pro-democracy movement is to achieve a peaceful transition, it will need to strike a delicate balance between sustained nonviolent activism — which provides necessary leverage for change — and clear-eyed negotiations to reassure Maduro, regime elites and Chavistas that their core interests will survive a return to democracy. This is an exceptionally difficult line to walk. But the Venezuelan people clearly want a return to democracy, and that desire may prove motivation enough for both the nonviolent mobilization and negotiated compromises needed to get there.
Nonviolent resistance to electoral fraud has famously sparked democratic transitions in the past, including prominent cases like Serbia and Ukraine. Studies show that these movements had several key qualities: they were large and well organized; maintained strict nonviolent discipline; and were highly creative with their tactics.
The Venezuelan people clearly want a return to democracy, and that desire may prove motivation enough for both the nonviolent mobilization and negotiated compromises needed to get there.
Venezuela’s pro-democracy movement is emulating these examples. Activists were organizing well before election day, encouraging turnout and establishing hundreds of comanditos (activist cells) to monitor the vote. When Maduro attempted to steal the election, activists quickly mobilized en masse — tens of thousands of protesters filled Caracas, with other protests emerging nationwide, from Portuguesa to Anzoátegui. The extent of mobilization reflects Maduro’s cratering popularity amid Venezuela’s economic collapse, as well as activists’ success in rejuvenating Venezuelans’ optimism after over a decade of struggle against Maduro. Especially noteworthy are Maduro’s deep losses in traditional chavismo strongholds, with residents of poor barrios (shantytowns) around Caracas pouring into the streets alongside Venezuelans from other social strata.
Importantly, the pro-democracy campaign has remained largely nonviolent. Machado, the movement’s key leader, is committed to peaceful resistance, and her embrace of religious symbolism has accentuated her calls for steadfast nonviolence (in recent appearances, Machado is armored in traditional catholic rosary beads). Although there have been some confrontations with police, there has not been major rioting, and Machado has stressed that the movement must remain peaceful.
The pro-democracy campaign is also employing a diverse tactical repertoire. Beyond street protests, activists have organized prayer circles with daily themes (“justice and liberty,” “sovereignty for Venezuela,” etc.); candlelit vigils; daily banging of pots and pans (cacerolazos); the distribution of pro-democracy leaflets; and memorial displays of those killed in protests alongside copies of the vote tally sheets. The movement has also engaged religious leadership across faiths, inviting a key pillar of society into the pro-democracy coalition.
A transition to democracy will not be easy. Maduro commands a kleptocratic petrostate, backed by regime loyalists as well as international allies such as Cuba, China and Russia. Maduro appears committed to repression without compromise.
The elephant in the room is Venezuela’s security apparatus. Nonviolent campaigns succeed by winning defections from regime pillars of support. In repressive states, the military is a key pillar — whether armed forces “defect or defend” determines whether protests are violently repressed or shielded from harm.
In Venezuela, the military is Maduro’s indispensable ally. Maduro has “coup-proofed” his regime through both cooptation (integrating the military into the economy and lavishing wealth on top officers) and counterbalancing (building out the National Guard, special police units, non-state armed gangs and popular militias as loyal agents of repression). The regime has proven adept at neutralizing defectors. These actors may also worry about prosecution for human rights abuses under a democratic government, further binding them to Maduro.
Generating internal divisions within this militarized bloc is a priority for the pro-democracy movement — regime elites must be convinced that the status quo under Maduro is unsustainable, and that a democratic future without him would not be so bad, after all. This will take exceptional finesse, with both sustained nonviolent activism and earnest negotiations. Civil resistance can help the pro-democracy movement sustain and magnify popular pressure for change, while negotiations with the regime and dialogue with Chavistas can ease concerns about a Venezuela ruled by the opposition. The movement’s north star should be a sustainable transition to peace and democracy in Venezuela, a vision for the future that respects the will of the majority while also ensuring that Chavistas have a political voice.
First, the pro-democracy movement will try to sustain mobilization, using González’s historic victory as proof that Maduro’s regime no longer reflects the popular will and cannot endure. An overwhelming majority of Venezuelans oppose Maduro — sustained nonviolent activism signals to Maduro and his allies that repression cannot resolve this underlying legitimacy crisis, and that a democratic transition is necessary.
The pro-democracy campaign must demonstrate that it can endure as long as necessary.
To achieve this, the pro-democracy campaign must demonstrate that it can endure as long as necessary. Otherwise, Maduro could wait out the pressure, picking off key organizers until the movement collapses. Activism involves real risks, and Venezuelans may be afraid to participate in demonstrations given Maduro’s violent repression. Machado has been appropriately cautious, calling for an “operational pause” on August 6 to strategize while avoiding bloodshed. She has since called for a global demonstration on August 17, which will be an important indication of the movement’s staying power. For the movement to endure, activists will need to use street protests judiciously alongside other, decentralized tactics, which can apply pressure while minimizing exposure to repression.
A sustained nonviolent campaign would also put the repressive apparatus in an uncomfortable position. Security forces often balk at turning their guns upon their own peaceful compatriots. Forcing military leadership into this dilemma, where siding with Maduro risks defections that fracture the military, is an important source of leverage for the pro-democracy movement.
Machado released a statement on August 5 exhorting the military and police to side with the people. Protesters have attempted to fraternize with soldiers, and there are many examples of police refusing to repress demonstrators. We also have first-hand knowledge that some colectivos (non-state armed gangs that support Maduro) have refused to use repressive measures. A wave of low-level defections like this could help pro-democracy forces to endure a sustained resistance campaign.
Above all, it is vital for the movement to remain nonviolent and democratic. Violence would only justify Maduro’s crackdown, and past attempts to remove Maduro through extra-institutional means backfired miserably. This time, the opposition is using the elections as a focal point, framing its campaign around calls for electoral transparency — that is, reinforcing democratic institutions, rather than bypassing them.
Nonviolent action generates necessary leverage for change, but it does not resolve a core underlying problem: Maduro cannot cede power without exposing himself and his allies to intolerable risks of prosecution. Thus, Maduro and his allies must be reassured that they have a future in a democratic Venezuela. That may involve immunity for past crimes, continued control over some security institutions, or some form of gradual and inclusive transition.
Maduro and his allies must be reassured that they have a future in a democratic Venezuela.
Negotiated transitions, especially involving highly politicized militaries, are notoriously difficult. It is hard for the opposition to credibly promise amnesty as, once in office, a civilian government can easily renege. But granting the ancién regime too much continued control to prevent this could cripple the transition. Protests can exacerbate this tension, as mass mobilization for accountability may leave opponents feeling threatened by democracy.
These issues are especially pronounced in Venezuela. In the past, the opposition embraced hardline pressure toward Maduro and failed to welcome former Chavistas into the pro-democracy coalition. Machado’s past uncompromising stance has produced problems of trust and credibility for her — this may explain why military leaders quickly rejected her call for defections. Machado is an inspiring movement leader, but her past stridency complicates dialogue with the regime and its supporters.
Nevertheless, the pro-democracy movement must find a way to negotiate a path forward. This includes private conversations with security leaders to encourage an end to repression. It also includes openness to dialogue with Chavistas that could drain Maduro’s remaining support. And it includes negotiations with Maduro and regime elites that would allow them to relinquish power safely. These compromises may delay justice, but they are ultimately necessary for a democratic transition.
Key regional stakeholders, especially Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, are also attempting to engage with Maduro. They may come to play an important mediating role in future negotiations. But they’ve made scant headway thus far, as they have little leverage — Maduro’s willingness to negotiate depends far more on internal pressures than external ones. The U.S.’s role is especially limited, both because sanctions provide little additional leverage, and because American intervention may discredit the pro-democracy movement more than it helps. U.S. policymakers are taking a backseat to regional powers and, more importantly, Venezuelans themselves.
Venezuela’s pro-democracy movement has many of the hallmarks of successful nonviolent activism. Yet it has struggled to build bridges with regime supporters in the past, and Maduro remains a tough opponent. To succeed, the movement must tread a new path, continuing peaceful and inclusive mobilization to demand change without foreclosing negotiations with their opponents.
Much depends on Machado’s disciplined leadership to keep the movement resolute, nonviolent and inclusive. The pro-democracy coalition must convey the necessity of difficult compromises to the Venezuelan people while asking them to commit to a long-term vision of democracy that goes beyond any election. Machado seems to appreciate this challenge and is pivoting toward a more inclusive stance than in years past. Whether this approach endures remains to be seen.
Ultimately, Venezuela is at a major inflection point. True democracy beckons, and Venezuelans have cultivated a more robust civil society than ever before. But if the pro-democracy movement fails, the Venezuelan crisis will continue to generate destabilizing spillover effects across the region. For all those who care about peace in Latin America, the time for democracy in Venezuela is now.
Consuelo Amat is a SNF Agora Institute assistant professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University.