KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
In his first National Day speech as Taiwan’s president, William Lai Ching-te called for regional peace while reaffirming that China and Taiwan “are not subordinate to each other.” Though Lai’s October 10 address was more restrained than past remarks, it was attacked by China’s state media as “highly provocative.” Days later, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) encircled Taiwan with record numbers of military aircraft and warships during a series of military “drills.”
This follows a pattern from Beijing since Lai took office. In late June, China released a set of judicial guidelines to prosecute advocates of Taiwan independence, saying they could face the death penalty in extreme cases. By September, more than 2,000 PLA aircraft had been recorded entering Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone in 2024, the highest annual number of incursions to date. Taiwan’s Digital Affairs Ministry reported over 90,000 cyberattack attempts targeting government infrastructure in August alone. From February to September, China’s Coast Guard vessels entered restricted waters near Taiwan’s outlying Kinmen Islands at least 40 times.
As China continues its pressure campaign against Taiwan and channels of cross-Strait communication continue to wither, the risk of miscalculation or unwanted escalation will likely grow in the months ahead. Going forward, the United States should encourage both sides to practice restraint.
USIP’s Naiyu Kuo, Dan Spinelli and Jennifer Staats discuss Lai’s approach to cross-Strait relations, how Beijing has challenged the new Taiwanese president since he took office and if the two sides are in a dangerous cycle of escalation.
Lai’s speech repeated many of the key themes from his inaugural address this May. He signaled a strong commitment to Taiwan’s autonomy by stressing that the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) are not subordinate to each other and promising that he would “uphold the commitment to resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty.” Lai also emphasized that China “has no right to represent Taiwan,” a stance frequently reiterated by Taiwan’s foreign ministry to counter Beijing’s efforts to exclude Taiwan from international fora. Yet Lai also suggested a potential framework for cross-Strait engagement. He appealed directly to China to cooperate with Taiwan on climate change, pandemic prevention and regional security, and called on Beijing to work with the international community to advance peace, security and prosperity.
Indeed, Lai may have been attempting to lower the temperature after a series of earlier provocative remarks that stoked Beijing’s ire. Speaking to a domestic audience days before National Day, for example, Lai posited that the PRC could not be Taiwan’s “motherland” because the ROC dates its founding to 1911, 38 years before the PRC’s establishment in 1949. In September, he suggested that if Beijing were intent on reclaiming lost territory, it should pursue territorial claims in Russia that were ceded by the Qing empire. Both statements drew sharp criticism from Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), and some domestic political opponents warned Lai was “provoking a war.”
Although Taiwan's foreign ministry urged China to recognize the goodwill Lai expressed, Chinese state media rejected the notion that Lai’s speech evinced “moderation” or “restraint,” and instead claimed it was a continuation of what it labels Lai’s “new two-state theory” and “separatist fallacies.”
Two days after the speech, China's Ministry of Commerce issued a statement saying it is studying further trade measures against Taiwan, which could result in new tariffs or other forms of economic pressure. Early in the week that followed, the TAO announced sanctions against Puma Shen, Robert Tsao and Kuma Academy for allegedly engaging in “separatist activities.” (Co-founded by Shen and funded by Tsao, Kuma Academy is a Taiwanese civil defense organization that trains civilians to respond to emergencies.)
On October 14, the PLA’s Eastern Theater announced “Joint Sword-2024 B” drills and deployed fighter jets, drones and warships to encircle Taiwan and simulate a potential blockade. As part of the one-day exercise, China flew a record number of 153 Chinese military aircraft around Taiwan in a 13-hour period. When the PLA announced the start of the exercises, it neither provided advance notice nor indicated the duration of the exercises, which aims to intimidate Taiwan psychologically and complicate Taiwan’s defense preparedness.
The military exercises encircled Taiwan and included joint air and naval combat readiness patrols, a blockade of key ports north, south and east of Taiwan, and an assault on maritime and land targets. Law enforcement vessels also featured prominently, as China’s Coast Guard (CCG) deployed 17 ships to patrol the waters surrounding Taiwan, the first time they have circumnavigated the island. In addition, four CCG vessels entered the restricted waters around the Matsu Islands for the first time.
Leaders in Beijing appear to see military action as the most effective tool for sending signals to Taipei, Washington and others in the region.
The pre-planned drills were shorter in timeframe but closer in proximity to Taiwan than the exercises conducted after House Speaker Pelosi visited the island in August 2022. The U.S. Department of Defense called the recent exercise “irresponsible, disproportionate, and destabilizing,” and a State Department spokesperson said China’s “response with military provocations to a routine annual speech is unwarranted and risks escalation.”
The TAO justified the drills as punishment for Lai’s alleged pursuit of “Taiwan independence.” On October 15, TAO claimed that Lai’s May inaugural speech, National Day address and remarks about the “motherland” were all responsible for escalating tensions, and warned that each provocation made by “separatists” in the name of "Taiwan independence” will be met with more intense countermeasures “until China's complete reunification is realized.”
The intensified pressure aims to weaken Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party, intimidate the Taiwanese public and challenge the Taiwan government’s autonomy to assert actual control over the island.
Both Beijing and Taipei continue to blame the other for changing the status quo, and view their own statements and actions as necessary responses to provocation from the other.
Leaders in Beijing appear to see military action as the most effective tool for sending signals to Taipei, Washington and others in the region. Until it faces meaningful consequences for this coercion, China’s political, economic, military and gray-zone pressures on Taiwan are likely to persist and possibly intensify as Beijing pushes its unification agenda and seeks to avoid appearing weak. Its incremental military actions, like the recent exercises, aim to pressure Taiwan without crossing red lines that would trigger significant international response.
Lai himself is also walking a tightrope. He must respond to critics, at home and abroad, who argue that he is not doing enough to defend Taiwan, while also being mindful of concerns on the island that his provocative comments risk drawing Taiwan into unwanted war. At the same time, China’s bellicose response to his more moderate remarks may lead Lai to believe there is nothing he can do to lower the temperature.
Without clear channels of communication, the two sides are often left guessing about the other’s intentions or concerns without the ability to frankly address or resolve key issues that could lead to unwanted escalation or conflict. Given the increasingly tense situation, it is incumbent on U.S. political leaders to consistently oppose unilateral changes to the status quo from either side, reaffirm that Washington does not support Taiwan independence and call on all parties to resolve their differences peacefully, so as to not exacerbate the potential for crisis.