U.S. Institute of Peace experts discuss the latest foreign policy issues from around the world in On Peace, a brief weekly collaboration with SiriusXM's POTUS Channel 124.

Transcript

Nayyera Haq: I'm excited about our next guest because he's going to talk to us about a movement that most of us have not heard about. And we may find something relatable and the purposes of this. Andrew Cheatham is a Senior Advisor for Global Policy working in the Executive Office of the U.S. Institute of Peace, Andrew, talk to us about this nonaligned movement, and how it's playing out in the global community with alliances from country to country.

Andrew Cheatham: Hi Nayyera. Thank you so much for having me. Yes. Well, you know, the nonaligned movement really started in the 50s and 60s, during the Cold War, when it was really prominent for states to say, look, I don't I don't want to be a part of the Soviet Union, US communist capitalist, binary choice. And it really, really took off to also be a movement for what they call the global south, developing countries for decolonization and development. And it was a strong, it was a strong movement, despite some internal some internal turmoil. But then after the Cold War, it sort of lost it had an identity crisis. And it didn't really know what to do. But all of a sudden, the nonaligned movement, which is 120 countries, it's the second largest multilateral movement after the United Nations. And it's starting to bud new fruit really, really starting with COVID. And the, the claim or inequities of COVID. But now with the war in Ukraine, and the greater competition with China, this is making this movement more and more prominent with these 120 countries that are very prominent in the UN General Assembly, and in geopolitics.

Nayyera Haq: Let's talk quickly about how NATO has played a role in the nonaligned movement. NATO, having been another answer to Cold War, military alliances, particularly now as we see Russian aggression, imperialism and invasion of Ukraine and NATO really taking a firm stance of supporting Ukraine, but not making this about a war to Russia, though Russia clearly sees the absorption of Finland into a NATO as a threat, as well as Sweden and potentially Ukraine even joining after this last NATO meeting. That's also considered to be a threat by Russia. So, folks who are in the nonaligned movement, for example, the other BRICS countries, BRICS, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, that's a group folks that they engage together in the United Nations, and that system of things. How are those other countries that have often allied with Russia, in some spaces, how are they now navigating the war in Ukraine?

Andrew Cheatham: Well, it's very interesting, you know, these countries like Sweden, and Finland and Switzerland, you know, which are often referred to as the neutrals, the European neutrals, you know, that that idea dates back to, you know, 18th century and before, but the nonaligned movement is ultimately the same thing. I mean, there's some legal differences in some respects, but ultimately, it's people who have said, in these great power competitions, we choose not to play a part, we choose not to take a side and that was the case with Sweden and Finland, until recently, as you say, when joining NATO. It is a tenant of the nonaligned movement to not join military alliances, that are deliberately choosing a side and a great power conflict. So, none of the NATO countries would qualify as it were to be to be in the nonaligned movement. But these countries, these 120 countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, mostly in the developing world, have interestingly chose and as you say, to say, look, we're not choosing a side in the Russia Ukraine battle, we today, we've seen that the grain deal is going to Russia is going to pull out of the grain deal. That grain deal was highly advocated by the nonaligned movement because they were suffering from the global food crisis that was a result of the war in Ukraine. So, I think the non-aligned movement looks at the war in Ukraine as an existential threat with a nuclear armed power on one side and then NATO on the other. And they also look at the effects like the grain the halting of both Ukrainian grain and Russian grain through the Black Sea and see the problems with this and say we're not choosing a lot of them also have not chosen to join on to the US sanctions. So, they're sort of bowing out of the of the side choosing and, and just want the war to end basically.

Nayyera Haq: And you've mentioned the nonaligned movement, also, looking at the Global South coming out of the COVID pandemic, realizing in places like India and Latin America that the vaccine access inequity, their inability that to get vaccines that are effectively were being developed in Europe and the United States. Now mind you developed with scientists, and expertise that often came from many of these developing world countries, right, like scientific community, global community, but encouraged and supported by dollars and more developed parts of the world where that can afford to invest in long term research. But companies then patenting and taking those and making it nearly inaccessible for anybody in Latin America, India, in Southeast Asia to be able to get vaccinated in a global pandemic. So, you're now seeing the BRICS countries say that they they're not going to be caught unprepared next time. What does that look like then? What is this idea of the Global South, preparing itself for the future pandemic, independent of donations from the developed world or from the west from, you know, what we call the West and Europe. What does that even look like?

Andrew Cheatham: Yeah, it's really, really interesting. So, Azerbaijan, who was the has been the chair of the nonaligned movement since 2019, was really outspoken, and on the front lines of bringing the nonaligned 120 countries together to virtually in 2022, to really speak out against what they saw as really, these inequities of a global problem that needed global solutions, is the way they looked at. They also are champions of climate issues, that which they see as affecting the global south, affecting island nations and many members of the nonaligned movement, disproportionately, and they asked, you know, where's the developed world? And I think it's important to note that, you know, we have this competition with China, of course, the war in Ukraine with Russia, but the major story in geopolitics is the rise of the rest. Fareed Zakaria talks about this, many others. So, you have, as you said, Brazil, South Africa, India, there are many other countries, the Gulf countries, Turkey, many countries besides the China and the US, and then possibly Russia as just major powers. And the rest are saying, we're going to form alliances like the BRICS, which they're hoping to expand in the new conference that they're going to have to some, I don't know, 30 countries, they're forming their own military alliances, their own economic alliances, to say, look, we're not going to wait for the West to take care of us, we're going to take action into our own hands economically and technologically. And I think it's just something that the US must bear witness to. I'll just tell you a quick story when I travel through the United States and speak to countries mostly in Africa, but also in Asia Pacific. They say, look, we don't want to have this choice, this zero-sum game, mostly between the US and China. We want there to be, you know, room for all. And so, there's an article just this last week, the myth of neutrality, countries will have to choose in foreign affairs. And that's the answer they don't want to hear. The administration has been good about rhetoric about saying they don't want to make people choose in a zero-sum game. But you know, the facts are that it's looking more and more that way.

Nayyera Haq: When we say we don't want to have to make that choice, and it's looking more and more that way, how does that choice play out?

Andrew Cheatham: Well, most I think strategically it plays out in places where China wants to have military bases, in Equatorial Guinea, it happened in the UAE, where there will be some really hard discussions with the US about choosing one side or the other. The other way it plays out is in, you know, in the economic race for critical minerals, for example, in Africa. There's lots of new mining, lots of new economic engagements, infrastructure projects to facilitate that, and also just infrastructure projects for general economic development in places like Africa, Latin America, and sometimes in these deals between the World Bank, the IMF, the so-called Bretton Woods, Western sort of Paris Club versus China. There is often this sense of a choice you either take our loan or you take this loan. It doesn't have to be that way. But its countries feel that they I've heard that countries feel they're being forced these choices and they don't like it.

Nayyera Haq: Well, and Andrew that's also the choice is often not made by the people who would have to then take on the debt is the choices made by autocrats, corrupt leaders, in many of these nations who want the quick money want the quick, yes, China built me a port built this country a port, like the Gwadar Port and Pakistan, for example. But then China with the massive interest that it has levied on these loans, if people the countries aren't able to pay them back, actually has walked in and nationalized many elements, meaning like we built you a port, you couldn't pay it because of our draconian terms, so we're just, you know, not only are we to staff it with our people, we're also going to take it over and this is part of their economic imperialism. Is there a United States counter to that, because typically, the United States has done infrastructure projects, like ports and dams and roads as part of a humanitarian or development exercise, which doesn't necessarily operate with that hard national security calculus that China is using.

Andrew Cheatham: Absolutely, you know, that debt trap diplomacy, as they call it of China's something that we've seen many countries suffer from. I think that the main offer that the US has, is with its allies, through multilateral systems, because China is just offering well has been through the Belt Road initiative, but it's gone down a little bit recently. But in general, has been offering on infrastructure and financing deals on a scale that we're just not prepared as a single country to do anymore. So, I think the only way we can match is working with our partners in the World Bank, in the IMF, but also through aid programs jointly through the United Nations The only offer we're going to be able to have as the US is with our allies, in countries to structure deals, as you say, that aren't part of some trap. And that also condition good governance, inclusive governance, democratic principles, human rights. They make that tailored for each country, not too onerous, the countries, you know, just can't do it, but also are part of a bigger package that helps serve the people and are ultimately more sustainable than what China has to offer. We are seeing I would just say Janet Yellen working in China to try to model the Zambian deals. Zambia, as you is one of the countries like you mentioned that was suffering from these Chinese loans. And there's been a deal to restructure the debt of Zambia between the debtors like the World Bank, and others and China. So that was a breakthrough. And Janet Yellen has recently said in her meetings in Beijing, that she hopes to use that as a model with the Chinese to have deals for countries trying to get out of these massive debts. So hopefully, there's some hope on the horizon. And hopefully the US can counter these offers from this debt trap diplomacy that you're talking about, of China.

Nayyera Haq: Indeed, when in the last question I have for them one minute, we have a left together, what are you planning for? How should we look at this September UN General Assembly, as part of this bigger picture of the nonaligned movement and you know, the United States ambitions on the world stage?

Andrew Cheatham: I think it's really exciting. I hope maybe I can come back on to talk about it. I mean, there's some really exciting things coming up with this General Assembly and I know a lot of people, especially in the United States, they get frustrated with the United Nations, because it can be quite inefficient at times. But in these days of great power competition, we need a multilateral body working at its best to try to deal with these global problems we have. They're looking at rethinking that not rethinking but reinvigorating the Sustainable Development Goals, which are 2030 goals to help countries you know, move to a more a better way of developing past these sorts of short-term debt traps, as you say, and raising up all people from the bottom up. So, they're looking at reinvigorating those also the Secretary General and many member states are going to meet on the sidelines about how to look at the youth and the next generation. How they will deal with issues, yes, like pandemics and climate but also technological disruption. It will be the next generation that must deal with this. So now, I think the United Nations is trying to partner you know, the wisdom of the ages for some of these older leaders we have with young leaders, sponsored by the United Nations and member states around the world to see how we're going to solve the problems of the future. That's going to be a big theme of this year's general assembly.

Nayyera Haq: Thank you so much. Andrew Cheatham, Senior Advisor for Global Policy at the United States Institute of Peace. Thank you for joining us today.