With the recent upsurge in activities by Iraqi insurgents, the question of how Iraq will weather the transfer of sovereignty on June 30 is increasingly on the minds of many around the globe. What steps can the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) take between now and June to help minimize instability in Iraq? How should the CPA deal with fringe forces, such as those lead by young Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, in light of continuing violence? On April 15, 2004 the Institute hosted a presentation by senior fellow Faleh Jabar on "Formative Forces in the Development of the Modern Iraqi State." A noted expert on Iraqi politics and civil society, Jabar discussed the particularistic nature of Iraq's social and political environment, including the historic forces that make up the modern Iraqi state, and discussed the prospects for democratization in Iraq.

A research fellow at the School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London, since 1994 Jabar has directed the Iraqi Cultural Forum Research Group, at Birkbeck College. He is author of The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq and editor of Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues: State, Religion and Social Movements in Iraq. He has also written and edited several books in Arabic, including State and Civil Society in Iraq and The Impossible Democracy: The Case of Iraq.

Report Summary

Iraqis discuss current events in a small market. USAID Photo

Democratizing Iraq is a case of having to reconcile the "dead past" with the "unfolding future," explained Institute senior fellow Faleh A. Jabar, at the opening of his presentation. While his research project was originally conceived as a primarily historical study of the social, political, and economic forces that combined to shape the modern Iraqi state and the implications for eventual democratization, the coalition invasion of Iraq necessitated a broadening of the scope of the project to consider post-conflict events and their implications for the consolidation of democracy. Jabar focused his project report on the research he has already completed on key forces—totalitarianism, oil rentierism, and the system of clan and family networks—that are essential to understanding present day Iraq. He closed his presentation with a discussion of nation building and the prospects for democratization in Iraq.

Totalitarianism

Using the "ideal type" model of totalitarianism as a ruler against which to evaluate Iraq, Jabar examined the Iraqi case in comparison to other totalitarian regimes in recent world history such as those seen in Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union. Generally, the concept of totalitarianism includes a single-party system, a command economy, total state control of the army and other sources of coercion, and total control of the media and other communications. Iraq has these elements, but in contrast to the ideal type, it has a weak industrial regime that coexists with what Jabar called the "primordial" element, namely the existence of vibrant kinship networks in a hierarchical society. The combination of totalitarianism and primordialism thereby results in a "thick" ruling clan-class that is deeply embedded in the society, as it is not just a small elite group, but rather an entire social layer united by blood, as well as economic and financial ties.

Oil Rentierism

Jabar argued that Iraq is different from other more classical totalitarian regimes because of its rentier state economy. A rentier state is one that has economic resources independent of society. In the case of Iraq, oil income is the basis of the political economy of authoritarian rule and a nonrational bureaucracy. These resources interrupt normal state-society relations where the state is dependent upon society for income in the form of taxes and is accountable to society for the use of that income. A rentier state, Jabar argued, is less likely to rely on diplomacy in its foreign relations, resorting more easily to war. Oil income also fuels a political economy of patronage, he noted, where personal relationships and crony capitalism are the driving forces. This distorts state-society relations by reshaping the business class in the image of the ruling clan-class. Jabar also stressed that no government has ever democratized "with oil revenues in its pocket." While Venezuela did democratize, the existence of democratic structures preceded the discovery of oil, he stated.

In Iraq, Jabar argued, democratization will require the dismantling of the command economy; however, Jabar advised against immediate privatization of Iraq's assets and instead recommended undertaking a centrist approach, with gradual deregulation and ample social safety nets. One of the strong points of totalitarian systems, Jabar observed, is that they offer a guarantee of safety, security, and employment to loyalists. Under the totalitarian system in Iraq, there was a social contract between the state and society that amounted to the provision of social services (i.e., free medical care and education) in return for allegiance to the ruler. An abrupt shift from patronage to a market economy without the creation of any new social safety nets would prove disastrous, Jabar warned.

"Democracy rests on consent, but does not generate it," he observed. Consent is generated through the creation or expansion of economic participation among the people. Historical examples of this strategy include the French distribution of land following the French Revolution, the Marshall Plan in Germany after World War II, and MacArthur's redistribution of land in post-war Japan. Jabar cited the example of the Alaskan Permanent Fund, which pays oil revenues into a fund and distributes the dividends directly to the people, as a way that rentierism might be curbed and participation might be expanded in Iraq. He proposed a slightly modified version for Iraq, wherein perhaps 25 percent of oil revenues would be distributed directly to the people and taxed as income. This taxation would create the basis for accountability of the government to society. Such a distribution plan would apply a "flat-rate" approach to the whole country, and make it difficult for any ethnic or religious group to argue that one group was being favored over another.

Nation Building

In conclusion, Jabar discussed the case of Iraq as a multiethnic and multinational state. Although the term "nation building" has been thrown around a great deal with respect to coalition activities in Iraq, Jabar argued that in actuality it refers to two separate processes: state building (the development of a political system of governance) and nation building (the process of creating a cohesive whole through representation and inclusion of ethnic and religious groups). Various strategies have been used to attempt nation building throughout Iraqi history. Under the Monarchy, strategies included education and the creation of a landlord class that cut across traditional groupings and included Kurds, Turks, and Arabs. It was both a cost-effective way of managing the countryside and a system of national integration. It was nonetheless flawed, Jabar pointed out, because it disenfranchised the modern middle classes. In the Republican era, representation of the middle classes was improved, but the national integration process was disturbed. Saddam Hussein, however, destroyed both representation and national integration.

Today, Jabar argued, both Islamists and nationalists have the same totalitarian concept of the role of the state. They want to weaken and destroy the market economy. Under the Coalition Provisional Authority, however, the state industries have been dismantled and the bureaucracy thinned, both steps toward the dismantling of the command economy. There was also some growth of the propertied middle classes during the 1990s, even under sanctions, and in Jabar's opinion, it is these classes that will provide the basis for Iraqi democratization and nation building moving forward. "Wealth has no ethnicity," he said, and it will be the "universal unifier."

For more information on this topic see Jabar's May 2004 report, Postconflict Iraq: A Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy.